Many are calling for concrete mechanisms of oversight for health research involving artificial intelligence (AI). In response, institutional review boards (IRBs) are being turned to as a familiar model of governance. Here, we examine the IRB model as a form of ethics oversight for health research that uses AI. We consider the model's origins, analyze the challenges IRBs are facing in the contexts of both industry and academia, and offer concrete recommendations for how these committees might be adapted in order (...) to provide an effective mechanism of oversight for health‐related AI research. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the emergence of modern racist ideology during the nineteenth century. It examines the role played by the Victorian anatomists and anthropologists who constructed classifications of humans according to racial type, and depicted these types as having distinct and certain characteristics determined by their biological inheritance. This ideology of racism is a racial inequality dependent on a biological determinism based on science. From the 1930s to the 1950s, developments in science, specifically in human genetics and anthropology, led (...) to the retreat from scientific racism and biological determinism. In the aftermath of the Second World War, movements such as the international consensus on human rights and equality, decolonization, and civil rights advancement brought new hope to the eradication of racism. Despite initiatives for the abolition of racism, forms of inequality and discrimination persisted. These persistent forms of racism were largely based on institutional or pragmatic racism and deviated from the theoretical racism backed by biological determinism and scientific racism. They posed a great challenge to the empire. Taking the dominant mode of thinking on race as biological determinism, this chapter aims to reconsider this thinking as it misrepresents the Victorian discourse and misconstrues the nineteenth-century legacy on racism and race relations. What follows is an outline of the fault lines surrounding the disputes over the meaning and significance of race. (shrink)

This chapter is an edited transcription of an author-meets-critics session at the Truth 20|20 Conference, on Douglas Edwards’ award-winning book, The Metaphysics of Truth (2018, Oxford University Press). The Metaphysics of Truth tackles fundamental questions about the role of truth in connections between language and the world. Edwards proposes a pluralist account, according to which sentences in different domains get to be true in different ways. Kellen’s questions center around how to locate Edwards’s pluralist account given certain distinctions between (...) varieties of truth pluralism, and on how to determine what domains certain sentences belong to, especially mixed compounds. Taylor’s comments critically investigate Edwards’ critiques of deflationism, particularly to do with what the deflationist can say about whether truth counts as a ‘sparse’ or ‘abundant’ property, and whether deflationists are able to explain important differences between sparse properties such as being magnetic, and abundant properties, which deflationists will likely think include being true. Lynch provides several questions about the metaphysics of Edwards’s account, including the nature of the determination relation, and the nature of the property of truth itself, and whether Edwards’s account of that property manages to distinguish itself from something a truth minimalist would be happy with. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this wide-ranging interview Professor Douglas V. Porpora discusses a number of issues. First, how he became a Critical Realist through his early work on the concept of structure. Second, drawing on his Reconstructing Sociology, his take on the current state of American sociology. This leads to discussion of the broader range of his work as part of Margaret Archer’s various Centre for Social Ontology projects, and on moral-macro reasoning and the concept of truth in political discourse.

A probiotic turn is underway in the management of human and environmental health. Modern approaches are being challenged by deliberate interventions that introduce formerly taboo life forms into bodies, homes, cities and the wider countryside. These are guided by concepts drawn from the life sciences, including immunity and resilience. This analysis critically evaluates this turn, drawing on examples of rewilding nature reserves and reworming the human microbiome. It identifies a common ontology of socio-ecological systems marked by anthropogenic absences and tipped (...) across thresholds into less desirable states. It examines the operation of an environmental mode of biopower associated with deliberate efforts to engineer ecologies through the introduction of keystone species. It offers a set of criteria for critically evaluating the degree to which these interventions transform or sustain prevalent forms of late modern biopolitics. The conclusion reflects on the potentials of probiotic environmentalities for hospitable government beyond the Anthropocene. (shrink)

Recent claims contrast relief experienced because a period of unpleasant uncertainty has ended and an outcome has materialized (temporal relief)—regardless of whether it is one’s preferred outcome—with relief experienced because a particular outcome has occurred, when the alternative was unpalatable (counterfactual relief). Two studies (N = 993), one run the day after the United Kingdom left the European Union and one the day after Joe Biden’s inauguration, confirmed these claims. “Leavers” and Biden voters experienced high levels of relief, and less (...) regret and disappointment than “Remainers” and Trump voters. “Remainers” and Trump voters showed an effect of precursor, experiencing little relief about the outcome that had occurred but stronger relief that a decision had been implemented. Only Trump voters who believed the election was over showed this precursor effect. Results suggest at least two different triggering conditions for relief and indicate a role for anticipated relief in voting behavior. (shrink)

First published in 1984, Cultural Analysis is a systematic examination of the theories of culture contained in the writings of four contemporary social theorists: Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas. This study of their work clarifies their contributions to the analysis of culture and shows the converging assumptions that the authors believe are laying the foundation for a new approach to the study of culture. The focus is specifically on culture, a concept that remains subject (...) to ambiguities of treatment, and concentrates on questions concerning the definition and content of culture, its construction, its relations with social conditions, and the manner in which it may be changing. The books demonstrates how these writers have made strides towards defining culture as an objective element of social interaction which can be subjected to critical investigation. (shrink)

That the words πрύλις πрύλέες belong to the Cypriot dialect cannot be seriously doubted; the statement still occasionally encountered that they are Cretan rests mainly, as will be shown below, on the arbitrary and ill-judged emendation of the authoritative text which ascribes them to Cyprus. If is πрύλέες Cypriot, it is a priori probable that it should be added to the Achaian element in the vocabulary of Homer. That both words survived from Achaian days in the Doric of Crete is (...) perfectly possible. That the dialect of a central district absorbed various Achaian forms is a well-known fact, established by inscriptions from Eleutherna and Axos; the name of a dance in general use might pass into the common speech of the island. Whether προυλέσι explained by Hesychius as πεξοîς òπλίΤаіς represents a similar survival in Boeotian, or more probably Laconian, it is impossible to say. (shrink)

In C.Q. xliii , p. 126, Messrs. Klos and Minio-Paluello write: ‘Burnet's and Robin's collations of W… differ for the text of the Phaedo in about 130 readings of a more than orthographical interest. A new inspection of the manuscript has shown that Robin very often corrected Burnet, but added some twenty mistakes.’ As this may give a false impression of Burnet as a collator, it will be well to recall Burnet's own statement in C.Q. xiv , p. 132: ‘He (...) [Wilamowitz] says that my collations of W are inadequate, and have been shown to be so by Schoene for the Symposium, and by Hensel for the Theaetetus and Politicus. As he refers his readers to my Prefaces , he has presumably read them, and ought to have known that I never collated W at all or even saw it.’. (shrink)

If “perfectionism” in ethics refers to those normative theories that treat the fulfillment or realization of human nature as central to an account of both goodness and moral obligation, in what sense is “human flourishing” a perfectionist notion? How much of what we take “human flourishing” to signify is the result of our understanding of human nature? Is the content of this concept simply read off an examination of our nature? Is there no place for diversity and individuality? Is the (...) belief that the content of such a normative concept can be determined by an appeal to human nature merely the result of epistemological naiveté? What is the exact character of the connection between human flourishing and human nature? These questions are the ultimate concern of this essay, but to appreciate the answers that will be offered it is necessary to understand what is meant by “human flourishing.” “Human flourishing” is a relatively recent term in ethics. It seems to have developed in the last two decades because the traditional translation of the Greek term eudaimonia as “happiness” failed to communicate clearly that eudaimonia was an objective good, not merely a subjective good. (shrink)

Douglas proposes a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, protecting the integrity and objectivity of science.

Esta pesquisa analisa alguns tópicos sobre a metodologia de acordo com a filosofia da ciência de Larry Laudan, além de examinar, na área da educação, esta proposta de interpretação filosófica. Trouxemos como elementos algumas considerações e definições sobre a metodologia em Laudan, isto é, da metodologia como um instrumento para a realização da axiologia (que são as metas e os valores cognitivos), porém, apresentando também interessantes relações para com as teorias específicas, como o de justificar as teorias específicas e de (...) ser restringida por elas. A metodologia é também, dentro do modelo reticulado de Laudan, justificada pela axiologia. Para além desta análise, há também uma defesa da metodologia enquanto o estudo dela própria, o que permite encontrarmos conexões interessantes em teorias da educação, como no caso da investigação-ação, onde vemos que estamos diante de uma tradição de pesquisa nos moldes defendidos pela filosofia da ciência de Laudan, por reconhecermos que temos um modelo reticular composto por teorias específicas, metodologias e axiologia também na área da educação. Veremos também que a metodologia em Laudan possui um caráter dinâmico, tensionando e sendo tensionada pelos componentes da tradição de pesquisa, caracterizando o modelo reticulado de racionalidade proposto pelo filósofo. Este debate em Laudan, juntamente com a tradição de pesquisa da investigação-ação da área da educação serão investigados neste artigo. Como base para a construção deste texto, utilizamos as seguintes obras de Laudan: The Progress and its problems: towards a theory of scientific growth (1977), Science and Values (1984a), Explaining the success of science: beyond epistemic realism and relativism (1984b), Methodology’s prospects (1986), Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism (1987a), Aim-less Epistemology? (1990a) e Normative Naturalism (1990b). (shrink)

Our theological pictures of God, the world, and ourselves sometimes change in order to take account of scientific findings, ideas, and beliefs. How might they alter in response to recent ideas about the cosmos and the place of us humans in it?

Distinguished scientists and thinkers from a wide range of disciplines examine the relationship of scientific knowledge and practice to the wider dimension of human life and awareness.

Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons. Broadly construed, consequentialism is the view that an act's deontic status is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. Portmore argues that outcomes should (...) be ranked, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the relevant agent has to desire that each outcome obtains and that, when outcomes are ranked in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many forms of deontology can. What's more, Portmore argues that we should accept this version of consequentialism, because we should accept both that an agent can be morally required to do only what she has most reason to do and that what she has most reason to do is to perform the act that would produce the outcome that she has most reason to want to obtain.Although the primary aim of the book is to defend a particular moral theory, Portmore defends this theory as part of a coherent whole concerning our commonsense views about the nature and substance of both morality and rationality. Thus, it will be of interest not only to those working on consequentialism and other areas of normative ethics, but also to those working in metaethics. Beyond offering an account of morality, Portmore offers accounts of practical reasons, practical rationality, and the objective/subjective obligation distinction. (shrink)

Properties and objects are everywhere, but remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring argues that the idea of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--provides the best foundation for a metaphysical account of properties and objects. He develops and defends a new theory of trope nominalism.

Douglas Sturm, a major ethical thinker, here presents ten intriguing essays that lay the groundwork for a communitarian political theory. Drawing on the work of Alfred North Whitehead and Bernard E. Meland, Sturm brings the implications of process thought, especially its principle of internal relations, to bear on the interpretation and evaluation of our social and political life. He argues that American individualism, including its curious transmutations into the forms of corporativism, racism, and nationalism is a constraint that deprives (...) us of a deeper, more complex understanding of ourselves and a richer sense of the goodness of our lives. The essays contrast a communitarian political theory with alternative traditions of social thought, particularly those forms of individualism generated by Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham. Political realities of power, rights, and interests are not to be dismissed, according to Sturm, but they need to be cast within a concept of politics that sustains a community as a whole; thus public good and justice are defined as the central principles of public life. He isolates alternative theoretical perspectives and demonstrates how they deal with several current social and political dilemmas. Sturm applies the principles of the communitarian political theory to a broad range of contemporary concerns: the character and legitimacy of the modern business corporation; the idea of democratic capitalism; legal realism as the prevailing jurisprudence of the practicing lawyer; the scope and focus of bioethics as a discipline. In doing so, he affirms both the inescapability of public life in our existence and the radical character of the evil that it often creates. (shrink)

The infamous difficulty of Lacan's writing has its own, very apt synecdoche: the matheme. What makes this ‘little letter’ that structures the signifier so apposite a device is how it stymies even those sophisticated readers for whom Lacan is as close-readable as Mallarm e. The proposition offered here is that this crisis of reading is not the consequence of either some terrible mistake or egregious failing in character, but rather a typically Lacanian move by which his text stages the very (...) theory it is presumably explicating. This article suggests that by striving to read the matheme, instead of seizing upon excuses to avoid it, we can begin to understand what Lacan meant when he said that everything emerges from the structure of the signifier. (shrink)

In this paper, the difficulties inherent in the debate between moral nativists and antinativists, who differ in their beliefs on the nature of systems of morality, are shown to exemplify the need for philosophers to support their views with empirical data. Furthermore, it proposes that an empirical study of first-generation immigrant populations has the potential to resolve the debate over moral nativism, as it would allow researchers to observe the moral “critical period.” Based on the recent philosophical advances made through (...) experimental evidence, this paper goes on to argue that empirical data is a valuable source of information from which philosophers ought to draw. (shrink)

This is an encyclopedia entry on consequentializing. It explains what consequentializing is, what makes it possible, why someone might be motivated to consequentialize, and how to consequentialize a non-consequentialist theory.

Wilson introduces us to nine of his favorite authors through their lives, key works, and legacies. In doing so, he shows what good writing looks like-- and helps you become a better reader.

Perceptual experience seems to involve distinct intentional and qualitative features. Inasmuch as one can visually perceive that there is a Coke can in front of one, perceptual experience must be intentional. But such experiences seem to differ from paradigmatic intentional states in having introspectible qualitative character. Peacocke argues that a perceptual experience’s qualitative character is determined by intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties. But and also argues that perceptual experiences have nonconceptual representational content in addition to conceptual content and nonrepresentational sensational properties. He (...) thus distinguishes between conceptual, nonrepresentational, and nonconceptual but representational aspects of perceptual experience. I will argue that Peacocke posits too much. Contrary to his arguments, the sensational properties Peacocke claims are nonrepresentational are best construed as representational; they are best explained in terms of their relation to the perceptible properties they enable us to perceive. Since sensational properties are arguably nonconceptual, they are best construed as nonconceptual representational properties. I offer the Homomorphism View of sensory qualities, pioneered by Sellars , as a unified account of qualitative character and nonconceptual sensory representation. According to this view, a sensory quality represents a perceptible stimulus property in virtue of resembling and differing from other sensory qualities in ways parallel to the ways the stimulus property resembles and differs from other perceptible properties. (shrink)

The numerous systems designed to facilitate animals’ use of computers often are specific to the animals involved, their unique context, and the applications – enrichment among them. Hence, several development methods have arisen in parallel, largely transposed from the human-computer interaction (HCI) domain. In light of that prior work, the paper presents a step-by-step guide for iteratively designing and constructing interactive computers for animals, informed by the rich history of HCI yet applying animal-centred principles, to enrich animal-computer interaction. For each (...) stage in the iterative design (requirements, ideation, prototyping, and testing), the author reflects on real-world experience of building interactive devices for various animals. The paper concludes with overarching considerations vital for future practice of developing interactive computers for animals. Thus, it serves as a valuable reference and information source for researchers designing novel computer systems for animals. (shrink)

This article aims to present the emergence and the problems which the concept of Thatsache or fact of consciousness attempts to solve in the development of elementary philosophy in its early years. To accomplish this task four texts will be analyzed in three steps. Primarily, the investigation focuses on the difference between internal and external conditions of representation in relation to the mere representation and the problems which it rises in his Essay on a new theory of the human capacity (...) of representation. Secondly, the article analyses how Reinhold tries to solve these problems through the concept of fact of consciousness proposing a definition to the representation as a proposition in his On the possibility of philosophy as rigorous science and New presentation of the chiefs moments of elementary philosophy, both present in the Contribution to the correction of previous misunderstandings of the philosophers. Thirdly, how this concept works not only as a principle of consciousness, but also as a ground to elementary philosophy and the philosophy as well, especially in the On the foundation of philosophical knowledge, known just as Fundamentschrift. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty’s late lecture course on Heidegger is primarily concerned with probing the possibility of a phenomenological ontology. Merleau-Ponty’s lectures provide a rather straightforward presentation of Heidegger’s later thought, without elaborate commentary or criticism. However, Merleau-Ponty does favor Heidegger’s later move toward an indirect expression of Being but does not think that he consistently maintains this view. By the time that we reach the end of Merleau-Ponty’s lecture course, we begin to see a number of differences between the two philosophers come (...) into play, with Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy solving more problems than that of his German counterpart. (shrink)

In a note on Aesch. Ag. 1243 f. in C.R. lxxv 187-8, I had occasion to cite a number of examples of adverbial transference. Whether they were or were not adequate to establish the point I was seeking to make I leave to the judgement of others, but the idiom possesses interest of its own, and it seems worth while to quote some further instances of it that I have noted since my article appeared. I will divide them according as (...) they occur with verbs of hearing or with other verbs. (shrink)

Johnstone, H. W., Jr. Rhetoric and communication in philosophy.--Smith, C. R. and Douglas, D. G. Philosophical principles in the traditional and emerging views of rhetoric.--Wallace, K. R. Bacon's conception of rhetoric.--Thonssen, L. W. Thomas Hobbes's philosophy of speech.--Walter, O. M., Jr. Descartes on reasoning.--Douglas, D. G. Spinoza and the methodology of reflective knowledge in persuasion.--Howell, W. S. John Locke and the new rhetoric.--Doering, J. F. David Hume on oratory.--Douglas, D. G. A neo-Kantian approach to the epistomology of (...) judgment in criticism.--Bevilacqua, V. M. Lord Kames's theory of rhetoric.--Brockriede, W. E. Bentham's philosophy of rhetoric.--Anderson, R. E. Kierkegaard's theory of communication.--Macksoud, S. J. Ludwig Wittgenstein, radical operationism and rhetorical stance.--Stewart, J. J. L. Austin's speech act analysis.--Torrence, D. L. A philosophy of rhetoric from Bertrand Russell.--Clark, A. Martin Buber, dialogue, and the philosophy of rhetoric.--Bennett, W. Kenneth Burke--a philosophy in defense of un-reason.--Dearin, R. D. The philosophical basis of Chaim Perelman's theory of rhetoric. (shrink)

Andreas Schmidt and Neil Levy have recently defended nudging against the objection that nudges fail to treat nudgees as rational agents. Schmidt rejects two theses that have been taken to support the objection: that nudges harness irrational processes in the nudgee, and that they subvert the nudgee’s rationality. Levy rejects a third thesis that may support the objection: that nudges fail to give reasons. I argue that these defences can be extrapolated from nudges to some nonconsensual neurointerventions; if Schmidt’s and (...) Levy’s defences succeed, then some nonconsensual neurointerventions neither harness irrationality, nor subvert rationality, nor fail to give reasons. This, I claim, poses a challenge both to opponents of nonconsensual neurointerventions, and to defenders of nudging. (shrink)

The speech Against Euergos and Mnesiboulos describes a dispute over some naval gear. The dispute occurred early in the year 357/6 b.c. π' γαθοκλους ρχοντος, Dem. 47.44), when the speaker was a trierarch and supervisor of his symmory , and he refers to ‘the law of Periandros, by which the symmories were organized’ . There is no other specific reference to the law of Periandros. If 357/6 was the first year of its operation, it was probably passed in 358/7, but (...) that is not known for certain. The identity of the man is likewise uncertain, though it has plausibly been suggested that he was Periandros son of Polyaratos and that he was the Periandros who proposed an alliance between Athens and Arkadia in 362/1 . However, his identity is of no importance for the present article. Here I am concerned only to try to reconstruct what the law said about the symmories. Despite a great deal of modern discussion this question has still not been satisfactorily solved. The word συμμορα means ‘group’ or ‘division’ and does not necessarily have a technical or legal sense. But most of the Attic instances do have the special sense of a group of persons formed for the purpose of making payments of a compulsory tax or levy: either the property tax called εσορ, which was imposed at irregular intervals, or payments towards the maintenance of ships in the Athenian navy, which were required every year. A fragment of Philokhoros says that Athenians were divided κατ συμμορας for the first time in 378/7, and it is generally agreed that this means that symmories were first formed in 378 for the payment of eisphora. For the navy, however, there is no trace of symmories before the 350s, and everyone agrees that it was the law of Periandros which introduced the use of symmories for maintaining ships, which had previously been the sole responsibility of one trierarch or a pair of syntrierarchs for each ship. (shrink)

Originally published in 1916. This book reviews the common problems of philosophy and then critiques the varied epistemological theories of the time. A theory of knowledge may be either dualistic or monistic and realistic or idealistic. Examining the resulting doctrines at the beginning, this book then goes on to consider mysticism, psychology, logic, consciousness, intellectualism and then scientific method. A fascinating insight into early Twentieth century philosophy.

Some suggest that gene editing human embryos to prevent genetic disorders will be in one respect morally preferable to using genetic selection for the same purpose: gene editing will benefit particular future persons, while genetic selection would merely replace them. We first construct the most plausible defence of this suggestion—the benefit argument—and defend it against a possible objection. We then advance another objection: the benefit argument succeeds only when restricted to cases in which the gene-edited child would have been brought (...) into existence even if gene editing had not been employed. Our argument relies on a standard account of comparative benefit which has recently been criticised on the grounds that it succumbs to the so-called ‘pre-emption problem’. We end by considering how our argument would be affected were the standard account revised in an attempt to evade this problem. We consider three revised accounts and argue that, on all three, our critique of the benefit argument stands. (shrink)

Can philosophy be a source of hope? Today it is common to believe that the answer is no - that providing hope, if it is possible at all, belongs either to the predictive sciences or to religion. In this exciting and simulating book, however, Alexander Douglas argues that the philosophy of Spinoza can offer something akin to religious hope. Douglas shows how Spinoza is able, without appealing to belief in any traditional afterlife or supernatural grace, to develop a (...) profound and original theory of how humans can escape from the conditions of death and sin. Douglas argues that this theory of escape, which Spinoza calls beatitude, is the centrepiece of his entire philosophy, though scholars have often downplayed or ignored it. One reason for this scholarly neglect might be the difficulty of understanding Spinoza's theory, which departs from the standard doctrines and methods of Western philosophy. Douglas's interpretation therefore seeks inspiration beyond the Western tradition, drawing especially on the classical Daoist text Zhuangzi and its commentaries. Here, Douglas argues, surprising resonances with Spinoza's core ideas can be found, leading to a new way of understanding his strange yet compelling theory of beatitude. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that online echo chambers are in some cases and in some respects good. I do not attempt to refute arguments that they are harmful, but I argue that they are sometimes beneficial. In the first section, I argue that it is sometimes good to be insulated from views with which one disagrees. In the second section, I argue that the software-design principles that give rise to online echo chambers have a lot to recommend them. Further, (...) the opposing principle, serendipity, could give rise to serious harm, in light of the conclusion of the first section that sometimes we are better off being insulated from some content online. In the third section, I argue that polarization can be a useful tool for inculcating the appropriate attitudes in a person. (shrink)

A growing interest in and concern about the adequacy and fairness of modern peer-review practices in publication and funding are apparent across a wide range of scientific disciplines. Although questions about reliability, accountability, reviewer bias, and competence have been raised, there has been very little direct research on these variables.The present investigation was an attempt to study the peer-review process directly, in the natural setting of actual journal referee evaluations of submitted manuscripts. As test materials we selected 12 already published (...) research articles by investigators from prestigious and highly productive American psychology departments, one article from each of 12 highly regarded and widely read American psychology journals with high rejection rates (80%) and nonblind refereeing practices.With fictitious names and institutions substituted for the original ones (e.g., Tri-Valley Center for Human Potential), the altered manuscripts were formally resubmitted to the journals that had originally refereed and published them 18 to 32 months earlier. Of the sample of 38 editors and reviewers, only three (8%) detected the resubmissions. This result allowed nine of the 12 articles to continue through the review process to receive an actual evaluation: eight of the nine were rejected. Sixteen of the 18 referees (89%) recommended against publication and the editors concurred. The grounds for rejection were in many cases described as “serious methodological flaws.” A number of possible interpretations of these data are reviewed and evaluated. (shrink)

In Categorisation in Indian Philosophy: Thinking Inside the Box, Jessica Frazier has brought together an impressive array of scholars who have contributed nine essays, plus an introductory and concluding chapter, both written by her, which collectively provide a most fruitful perspective for examining classical South Asian traditions of thought. Creating categorial frameworks was certainly a prolific activity among the ancient and medieval authors of the darśanas, and indeed these authors drew heavily from pre-scholastic texts and language to build their systems. (...) Frazier in her concluding chapter gives a helpful synopsis of the various roles played by categories in Indian philosophies, classifying them as.. (shrink)

The regulation of glucose dehydrogenase (GLD) in Drosophila illustrates the combinatorial aspects of gene regulation in development. Furthermore, the findings serve to point up a general question about cukaryotic structural gene control: is regulation of expression always optimal?

We investigate computable subshifts and the connection with effective symbolic dynamics. It is shown that a decidable Π01 class P is a subshift if and only if there exists a computable function F mapping 2ℕ to 2ℕ such that P is the set of itineraries of elements of 2ℕ. Π01 subshifts are constructed in 2ℕ and in 2ℤ which have no computable elements. We also consider the symbolic dynamics of maps on the unit interval.

The relationship between Mary and the Holy Spirit can be appointed in Scriptures passages that supply us enough security to affirm it a different relationship of that others creatures can have with God. This relationship is a model of the integration desired by God with his Church. May be perceived that many of the mentions done at Holy Spirit in the New Testament have Mary like person of the respective context. Being herself a masterpiece of the Holy Spirit she is (...) quoted in intention to serve like prototype of that spreaks a text. Is based on this affirmation that Mary is a start point to the ecclesiology and to pneumatology since long tradition in the Church. A study about Mary and the Holy Spirit have in view, therefore, afford elements of theological elaboration to both treaties of fundamental relevance. (shrink)

This book provides a systematic analysis of many common argumentation schemes and a compendium of 96 schemes. The study of these schemes, or forms of argument that capture stereotypical patterns of human reasoning, is at the core of argumentation research. Surveying all aspects of argumentation schemes from the ground up, the book takes the reader from the elementary exposition in the first chapter to the latest state of the art in the research efforts to formalize and classify the schemes, outlined (...) in the last chapter. It provides a systematic and comprehensive account, with notation suitable for computational applications that increasingly make use of argumentation schemes. (shrink)

The effects of grandparental investment in relatives are apparent in human groups, suggesting that a postreproductive period in humans is selective. Although investment of relatives in kin produces obvious benefits for kin groups, selection for a postreproductive period in humans is not supported by evidence from chimpanzees. Instead, grandparental investment is likely a recent phenomenon of longevity, rather than an evolved feature.

Plato provocatively characterizes truth $$ in terms of harmony $$ at various points throughout his dialogues. While limited attention has been directed toward the role of musical concepts in Plato's general cosmology, not any attention has been directed toward how musical concepts function in relation to Plato's characterization of truth. In fact, this issue has had little occasion for consideration. Almost every contemporary translator empties terms such as $\grave\alpha\rho\mu o\nu\acute\iota\alpha,$ when co-incidental with $\acute\alpha\lambda\acute\eta\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha,$ of their musical content. As a consequence, (...) I argue, Plato's characterization of truth is made readily amenable to contemporary conceptions of truth-not necessarily a good thing since it robs us of the original richness of Plato's thought. The dissertation explores how retaining the aural meaning latent within $\grave\alpha\rho\mu o\nu\acute\iota\alpha$ and other terms of musical import serves to elucidate the rich complexion of Plato's notion of $\acute\alpha\lambda\acute\eta\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha.$ Ultimately, I show how Plato's use of musical terminology to characterize truth informs other features of his philosophical outlook, illustrate the cohesiveness and consistency of key texts believed problematic by other commentators, and underscore significant differences between Plato's $\acute\alpha\lambda\acute\eta\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha$ and ideas of truth prevalent today. ;For Plato, I argue $\acute\alpha\lambda\acute\eta\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha$ bears a meaning different from its primitive sense of oracular unconcealment and its later sense of correctness $,$ and a meaning also different from other terminological alternatives $.$ Truth, accordingly, turns out for Plato to be neither mysterious and groundless nor a matter of simple correspondence to an objective reality. The value of Plato's conception of truth as harmony consists in its ability to avoid the polarity of contemporary conceptions of truth as either objectively determinate or subjectively determinate . Truth is neither arbitrarily imposed upon the world by us, nor artificially imposed upon us by an antecedently structured and independent reality. The dissertation concludes by articulating reasons for favoring Plato's theory of truth, while noting a few underlying assumptions likely problematic for some contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

Developing the ethics of palliative sedation, particularly in contrast to terminal sedation, requires consideration of the relation between body and soul and of the nature of death and dying. Christianly considered, it also requires attention to the human vocation to immortality and hence to the relation between medicine and discipline. Leaning on Augustine’s rendering of the latter, this paper provides a larger anthropological and soteriological frame of reference for the ethics of palliative sedation, organized by way of nine briefly expounded (...) theses. It argues that palliative sedation, like other elements of medicine, is appropriate where, and only where, it properly orders care for the body to the requirements of care for the soul. (shrink)

While the Value-Free Ideal (VFI) had many precursors, it became a solidified bulwark of normative claims about scientific reasoning and practice in the mid-twentieth century. Since then, it has played a central role in the philosophy of science, first as a basic presupposition of how science should work, then as a target for critique, and now as a target for replacement. In this paper, we will argue that a narrow focus on the VFI is misguided, because the VFI coalesced in (...) the midst of other important shifts in the relationship between science and society. In particular, the mid-twentieth century saw the acceptance of the “social contract for science,” a tacit agreement between scientists and government officials, and more broadly between science and society. It was built around three core concepts: a distinction between basic and applied science, a conception of scientific freedom that limited social responsibility for scientists, and a justification for public funding of basic science in the form of the linear model. Within the conceptual framework of the social contract for science, it is clearer both (1) why the VFI was adopted, (2) why it is difficult to replace the VFI within the old social contract, and (3) how we need to revise the social contract for science in order to replace the VFI. (shrink)